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‘THE PECULIAR GENIUS OF PRIVATE-LAW 
SYSTEMS’: 
MAKING ROOM FOR RELIGIOUS COMMERCE 
MICHAEL A. HELFAND* 
ABSTRACT 
Religious commerce has long sat uncomfortably at the nexus of public 
law and private law. On the one hand, such transactions invariably have 
garden-variety commercial objectives, which are best achieved and 
regulated through the law of tort, contract, and property. And yet the 
intermingled religious aspirations of the parties often inject constitutional 
concerns that muddy the waters. To navigate these challenges, the Supreme 
Court famously embraced the neutral principles of law framework, which 
encouraged parties to draft private law agreements using secular 
terminology. Thus, while the Establishment Clause provided the outer 
boundaries for what was legally possible, the neutral principles of law 
framework made space for religion under the umbrella of private law. 
This equilibrium between public and private law, however, has become 
increasingly unsettled. As the permutations of contracting for religion have 
proliferated, courts and scholars have searched for tools to regulate what 
they view as problematic outcomes. At the core of such criticisms is an 
instinct that judicial enforcement of privatized religious obligation—
whether in the form of religious contracts generally or religious arbitration 
specifically—undermines a principled commitment to separation of church 
and state. In turn, courts and scholars have reached into their constitutional 
toolboxes, searching for legal doctrines that might eliminate the kinds of 
outcomes they view as offending fundamental constitutional principles. 
The goal of this Article is to argue that this public law instinct—the 
notion that regulating the field of religion and private law is best achieved 
through the expansion of constitutional prohibitions—is deeply misguided. 
And this is true not only for standard religious commerce, but also—and 
especially—for the religious commerce safety valve, religious arbitration. 
Ultimately, successfully merging religion and private law requires 
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promoting doctrines that, on the one hand, address legitimate concerns, but 
do so without eliminating the very legal terrain made possible by the neutral 
principles of law framework. Failure to do so—and reflexively reaching into 
our constitutional toolbox—leaves both courts and scholars without the 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the saying goes, when you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail. 
Unfortunately, what is true of carpentry is also becoming increasingly true 
of the law and religion field. For lawyers and scholars alike, questions of 
law and religion are viewed through the prism of public law—and even 
more specifically, the religion clauses of the First Amendment. This, to be 
sure, is quite natural. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses provide 
the dominant framework for regulating the relationship between church and 
state.  
But this constitutional focus ultimately neglects the ever-increasing 
subset of private law cases and questions that stand at the crossroads 
between religion and commerce.1 In such cases, parties enter a bargained-
for exchange where one of the agreed performances is, by its terms, 
religious. Thus, whether it is a pastor’s employment contract, the purchase 
of kosher food, or a religious arbitration agreement, parties can choose to 
protect their religious expectations not through the demands of public law, 
but through the instruments of private law.2  
 
1. See generally Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist 
Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769 (2015). 
2. For explanations of the distinction between private law and public law, see John C.P. 
Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012) (“Like many legal 
concepts, ‘private law’ has recognizable referents yet eludes precise definition. Private law defines the 
rights and duties of individuals and private entities as they relate to one another. It stands in contrast to 
public law, which establishes the powers and responsibilities of governments, defines the rights and 
duties of individuals in relation to governments, and governs relations between and among nations.” 
(footnote omitted)); Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 
UCLA L. REV. 671, 688 (1973) (“Private law consists of the substantive law which establishes legal 
rights and duties between and among private entities, law that takes effect in lawsuits brought by one 
private entity against another. The complement of private law is thus ‘public law’—the substantive law 












The challenge in such circumstances is ensuring that religious 
agreements avoid the constitutional pitfalls that often lead to 
nonenforcement. Notable among such pitfalls is the Establishment Clause’s 
religious question doctrine which prohibits courts from resolving cases 
where there is an “underlying controversy over religious doctrine and 
practice.”3 Accordingly, courts must “avoid . . . incursions into religious 
questions that would be impermissible under the [F]irst [A]mendment,”4 
including “interpret[ing] . . . ambiguous religious law and usage.”5 
As an antidote to the religious question doctrine, the Supreme Court 
famously embraced the neutral principles of law framework, which “relies 
exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of . . . law familiar to 
lawyers and judges.”6 At its core, this approach encourages parties to draft 
private law agreements using secular terminology, thereby allowing courts 
to resolve disputes implicating such agreements without threatening 
Establishment Clause principles.7 In this way, the neutral principles of law 
framework provides parties seeking to protect their religious expectations 
through private agreement with a clear option for ordering their affairs 
going forward. By taking advantage of “the peculiar genius of private-law 
systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to 
reflect the intentions of the parties”8—parties can draft secular provisions 
that will be interpreted and enforced in court. Thus, while the strictures of 
the Establishment Clause provide the outer boundaries for what is legally 
possible, the neutral principles of law framework makes space for religion 
under the umbrella of private law.  
 
defining the legal obligations of private individuals or entities to the government, and also establishing 
their liberties and opportunities in relation to the government.” (footnotes omitted)). 
3. Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that 
former church member’s suit against church and officials over the termination of her membership failed 
because courts may not adjudicate matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance”). 
4. Elmora Hebrew Ctr. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 730 (N.J. 1991); see, e.g., Serbian E. 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (“[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot 
be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal 
within a church of hierarchical polity . . . .”); Burgess, 734 F. Supp. at 31 (holding that court may not 
adjudicate a dispute that requires resolving an “underlying controversy over religious doctrine and 
practice”); Natal v. Christian & Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[C]ivil courts 
cannot adjudicate disputes turning on church policy and administration or on religious doctrine and 
practice.”). 
5. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708. 
6. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
7. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide 
church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.”).  













This equilibrium between public and private law, however, has become 
increasingly unsettled. As the permutations of contracting for religion have 
proliferated,9 courts and scholars have searched for tools to regulate what 
they view as problematic outcomes. At the core of such criticisms is an 
instinct that judicial enforcement of privatized religious obligation—even 
where such obligations are mutually agreed upon—undermines a principled 
commitment to separation of church and state. In turn, courts and scholars 
have reached into their constitutional toolboxes, searching for legal 
doctrines that might eliminate the kinds of outcomes they view as offending 
fundamental constitutional principles.  
The goal of this Article is to argue that this public law instinct—the 
notion that regulating the field of religion and commerce is best achieved 
through the expansion of constitutional prohibitions—is deeply misguided. 
Ultimately, successfully merging religion and private law requires 
promoting doctrines that, on the one hand, address legitimate concerns, but 
do so without eliminating the very legal terrain made possible by the neutral 
principles of law framework. Failure to do so—and reflexively reaching into 
our constitutional toolbox—leaves both courts and scholars without the 
tools they need to meet these legal challenges.  
This Article expands on this central theme, providing examples of where 
courts and scholars would do well to refocus on private law. It begins, in 
Part I, by describing the neutral principles of law framework and how the 
Court embraced this framework so as to make space for religious commerce. 
Part II then considers how courts should leverage private law techniques to 
interpret and enforce a wider range of claims implicating religious forms of 
commerce. This turn to private law would, thereby, stave off attempts to 
expand the scope of constitutional limitations on religious adjudication. Part 
III and the Conclusion then explore how the religious commerce safety 
valve—religious arbitration—has been increasingly beset by scholarly 
criticism that advocates for expanding the constitutional constraints of 
public law so as to restrict parties’ ability to submit disputes for privatized 
religious adjudication. In so doing, these critics not only underestimate the 
ability of private law doctrines to police the procedural and substantive 
fairness of religious arbitration, they also proffer alternative public law 
‘solutions’ that are likely to do damage to the aspirations of parties in the 
religious commercial marketplace. 
 
9. See Helfand & Richman, supra note 1, at 772–73. 












I. WHAT’S AT STAKE?  
When we talk about how the law protects religious liberty, we naturally 
think, first and foremost, about the First Amendment.10 Accordingly, 
determining the scope of legally enforceable religious rights requires resort 
to judicial interpretation of the religion clauses. And, as judicial views of 
rights afforded by the religion clauses ebb and flow, so does the range of 
protections granted various religious practices. 
But wholesale reliance on public law to protect and circumscribe 
religious rights neglects the various ways in which parties might use private 
law as an alternative method to ensure that the law protects religious 
objectives and aspirations. In this way, private law—which might be 
broadly defined as “the substantive law which establishes legal rights and 
duties between and among private entities”11—holds the potential to 
empower private parties to generate legal obligations with respect to 
religious aspirations in ways beyond what public law—which tracks “the 
substantive law defining the legal obligations of private individuals or 
entities to the government”12—might otherwise afford.  
The intersection of private law and religion covers a range of cases, 
including contracts, property, and tort.13 In such cases, private parties enter 
into legal transactions or incur legal obligations that ultimately incorporate 
both commercial and religious objectives. Thus, for example, when parties 
enter into a religious contract, they seek to secure a contractual right to 
either a product or a service that includes some sort of religious requirement 
or performance. Because these requirements, obligations or performances 
are—in part—religious, the most natural mechanism to memorialize them 
in a contract or other commercial instrument is through religious 
terminology. However, incorporating religious terminology into contracts 
raises an important constitutional conundrum.  
Pursuant to the Establishment Clause, “civil courts cannot adjudicate 
disputes turning on church policy and administration or on religious 
 
10. Cf. BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INDEX: AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (2019) (emphasis added), https://s3.amazonaws.c 
om/becketnewsite/2019-Religious-Freedom-Index.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9YN-EKBU] (“The 
Religious Freedom Index is designed to give a 30,000-foot view of changes in American attitudes on 
religious liberty by surveying a nationally representative sample of 1,000 American adults. Rather than 
focus on the most hot-button issues dominating the news cycle, questions asked in the Index cover a 
wide spectrum of religious liberty protections under the First Amendment.”); FREEDOM FORUM INST., 
THE 2019 STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2019), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/SOFAreport2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8FM-HTGV] (finding that 29 
percent of Americans surveyed recalled that the First Amendment protected religious liberty). 
11. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 688 (footnote omitted).  
12. Id.; see also id. at 689–90 (describing the core areas of private law). 













doctrine and practice.”14 This doctrine—typically referred to as the 
“religious question doctrine”—is generally understood to prohibit courts 
from resolving cases where there is an “underlying controversy over 
religious doctrine and practice.”15 Accordingly, courts must “avoid . . . 
incursions into religious questions that would be impermissible under the 
[F]irst [A]mendment.”16 And in turn, they cannot “interpret[] . . . ambiguous 
religious law and usage”17 or resolve “controversies over religious doctrine 
and practice.”18 
Scholars have long debated the underlying rationale behind the religious 
question doctrine.19 For some, the religious question doctrine is a 
recognition that courts lack the constitutional competence to address claims 
that revolve around questions of faith. As described by the Supreme Court, 
“[r]eligious experiences . . . may be incomprehensible to others” and 
therefore “beyond the ken of mortals;”20 accordingly, “[c]ourts are not 
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”21 Or, in the words of Ira Lupu and 
Robert Tuttle, the most prominent advocates of the “adjudicative disability” 
approach, the Establishment Clause instructs courts not to interfere in cases 
implicating religious doctrine or practice because such “claims would 
require courts to answer questions that the state is not competent to 
address.”22 
Others have adopted a different approach that focuses less on the 
inability of courts to penetrate the substance of religious law, but more 
directly on a different consequence of resolving religious questions: that 
choosing a side in a religious-question dispute would constitute an 
impermissible endorsement of one religious view over another. For 
 
14. Natal v. Christian & Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989). For more on the 
religious question doctrine, see Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial 
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005); Samuel J. 
Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and 
Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1997); Christopher C. Lund, Rethinking the “Religious-Question” 
Doctrine, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1013 (2014). 
15. Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D.D.C. 1990). 
16. Elmora Hebrew Ctr. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 730 (N.J. 1991); see, e.g., Serbian E. 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); Natal, 878 F.2d at 1576; Burgess, 734 F. 
Supp. at 31. 
17. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708. 
18. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
19. For an excellent taxonomy, see Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 855–63 (2009). For my part, I 
have argued that much of the religious question doctrine as applied by courts stems from doctrinal errors. 
See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (2013). 
20. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944). 
21. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
22. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between 
Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 138 (2009). 












example, Laurence Tribe has argued that the prohibition against “doctrinal 
entanglement in religious issues. . . . [m]ore deeply . . . reflects the 
conviction that government—including the judicial as well as the legislative 
and executive branches—must never take sides on religious matters.”23 
Similarly, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have argued that “[i]f 
government were to endorse some interpretations of religious doctrine at the 
expense of others, it would thereby favor some religious persons, sects, and 
groups over others.”24 And Kent Greenawalt has raised a similar concern, 
worrying that judicial resolution of interdenominational disputes may be 
perceived as “the possible endorsement of one minority group.”25 
Still others have argued that courts are constitutionally prohibited from 
resolving religious questions because of the impact of such adjudication on 
religion. Thus, Andrew Koppelman has argued that “[t]he legitimate 
authority of the state does not extend to religious questions” because 
adjudication of such questions would lead to the “corruption” of religion—
that is, “[r]eligious teachings are likely to be altered, in a pernicious way, if 
the teachers are agents of the state.”26 And others have justified the religious 
question doctrine on pluralist grounds: “that secular authorities lack the 
power to answer some questions—religious questions—whose resolution 
is, under an appropriately pluralistic political theory, left to other 
institutions.”27 Accordingly, Richard Garnett has argued, “[i]t is not that 
religious questions are hard, weird, or irrelevant; it is that they are questions 
that the political authority lacks power, or jurisdiction, to answer.”28 
Regardless of account, the religious question doctrine presents a 
formidable challenge to religious commerce. If courts cannot resolve 
religious questions, how can they enforce religious commercial agreements 
that facilitate the exchange of religious goods and services? To address this 
challenge, the Supreme Court famously embraced the neutral principles of 
law framework, which “relies exclusively on objective, well-established 
concepts of . . . law familiar to lawyers and judges.”29 At its core, this 
approach seeks to disentangle religious disputes from religious questions, 
thereby allowing courts to resolve such disputes without threatening 
 
23. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14–11, at 1231 (2d ed. 1988).  
24. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 807, 812 (2009). 
25. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance 
of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 804 (1998) (describing the 
endorsement concern implicated by various state kosher laws). 
26. Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1831, 1897–98 (2009). 
27. Garnett, supra note 19, at 861 (emphasis omitted). 
28. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 













Establishment Clause principles.30 Accordingly, while courts may not 
resolve “controversies over religious doctrine and practice”31 and must 
“avoid . . . incursions into religious questions,”32 courts can resolve religious 
disputes so long as the documents at the heart of the dispute employ 
secular—as opposed to religious—terminology.  
In turn, the Court’s neutral principles of law framework provided 
religious entities with a clear option for ordering their affairs going forward, 
which it expressed in the context of disputes over church property: 
“[t]hrough appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious 
societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a 
particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership 
in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy.”33 In turn, this focus on 
neutral principles would “free civil courts completely from entanglement in 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”34 Put differently, the 
Court encouraged private parties to take advantage of “the peculiar genius 
of private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and 
obligations.”35 By memorializing religious commitments in secular 
terminology, parties could ensure that courts would enforce their religious 
commercial agreements in a manner that “reflect[ed] the intentions of the 
parties.”36 Where parties have employed secular terminology, courts would 
not need to dismiss claims on First Amendment grounds; to the contrary, 
the neutral principles of law approach would enable lower courts to resolve 
disputes without getting mired in constitutional objections.  
However, while the neutral principles doctrine may have opened a door 
for religiously motivated private parties to use private law, the 
encroachment of public law enthusiasts has, over time, threatened to slam 
that door shut.  
 
30. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide 
church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.”).  
31. Id. at 449–50 (“But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property 
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and 
practice.”). 
32. Elmora Hebrew Ctr. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 730 (N.J. 1991).  
33. Jones, 433 U.S. at 603. 
34. Id. To be sure, both of these commitments have been contested since the moment the Court 
announced its decision in Jones v. Wolf. See Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 969 (1991); Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of 
Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1409–10 (1981) (arguing that the neutral principles 
approach limits judicial inquiry in ways that undermine a court’s ability to reach a justifiable outcome); 
Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1843, 1884–85 (1998) (worrying that the neutral principles approach can lead to outcomes that 
“are likely to diverge from the actual understandings of those concerned”). 
35. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. 
36. Id. 












II. ENFORCING RELIGIOUS COMMERCE 
The primary challenge to implementing the neutral principles approach 
to religious forms of commerce is, what Barak Richman and I have called 
elsewhere, the “translation problem”—that is, many religious objectives 
cannot be captured in alternative secular terminology, and thus religious 
terminology cannot always be translated into secular analogs.37 Therefore, 
when parties seek to purchase “religious” goods or “religious” services, 
drafting contract terms that describe the intentions of the parties invariably 
necessitates incorporating religious terminology.  
Consider the following. Maybe the classic example of a commercial 
transaction for a religious good is the purchase of kosher food.38 As 
“defined” by the Encyclopedia Judaica, kosher is the “collective term for 
the Jewish laws and customs pertaining to the types of food permitted for 
consumption and their preparation.”39 Importantly, the worldwide kosher 
food market is far from trivial; estimates value it at $24 billion and 
projections anticipate it growing an additional 11.5 percent by 2025.40 The 
challenge with incorporating the term kosher into any commercial contract 
is precisely because it, by definition, incorporates by reference all the 
“Jewish laws and customs” relevant to the food creation process—from 
ingredients to preparation to delivery—rendering the term a complex 
religious term that cannot be translated into some sort of secular analog.41  
This translation problem has undermined the ability of parties to kosher 
commercial transactions to exercise their rights. For example, in 2012, 
eleven plaintiffs filed suit—on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 
situated—against ConAgra, the parent corporation of the Hebrew National 
brand.42 Hebrew National has long been famous in the United States for its 
“kosher” hotdogs, which it advertises as being of exceedingly high quality 
because the company “answer[s] to a higher authority.”43 The plaintiffs 
 
37. See Helfand & Richman, supra note 1, at 779–86. 
38. For my extended consideration of kosher regulation, see Michael A. Helfand, When Judges 
Are Theologians: Adjudicating Religious Questions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW & RELIGION 
262 (Rex Ahdar ed., 2018). 
39. Harry Rabinowicz & Rela Mintz Geffen, Dietary Laws, in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 650, 
650 (Michael Berenbaum & Fred Skolnik eds., 2d. ed. 2007).  
40. See Jon Springer, Kosher Food Market Set to Grow, Research Shows, SUPERMARKET NEWS 
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.supermarketnews.com/consumer-trends/kosher-food-market-set-grow-res 
earch-shows [https://perma.cc/G4RK-7KWU]. 
41. See generally Rabinowicz & Geffen, supra note 39 (describing the various requirements 
encompassed under the umbrella of “kosher”). 
42. See Class Action Complaint, Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 
2013) (No. 0:12-cv-01354-DWF-TNL).  
43. Id. at 24; see also We Answer to a Higher Authority, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wik 













highlighted these advertising claims of ConAgra, emphasizing that the 
company advertises its meat products as “100% kosher ‘as defined by the 
most stringent Jews who follow Orthodox Jewish law.’”44  
However, the plaintiffs contended that contrary to these representations, 
Hebrew National meat products did not satisfy these kosher standards.45 
Indeed, according to the complaint, employees informed the kosher 
certification companies that Hebrew National procedures had “rendered the 
meat being processed not kosher” and instead of acting on this information, 
“little or nothing” was done to correct these kosher violations.46 As a result, 
the complaint alleged that purchasers of Hebrew National meat products 
overpaid for these products, mistakenly believing them to be “100% 
kosher.”47 In turn, the complaint stated that ConAgra should be held liable 
for these misrepresentations regarding the kosher quality of these meat 
products under various consumer protection laws as well as for breach of 
contract and negligence.48 
As its defense, ConAgra asserted that the religious question doctrine 
prohibited a court from adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims: “[u]nder the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, federal courts may not 
adjudicate disputes that turn on religious teachings, doctrine, and 
practice.”49 And, as argued by ConAgra, “[w]hether or not something is 
‘kosher’ is exclusively a matter of Jewish religious doctrine.”50 The district 
court adopted ConAgra’s view almost verbatim, dismissing the plaintiffs’ 
claims: “[t]he definition of the word ‘kosher’ is intrinsically religious in 
nature, and this Court may not entertain a lawsuit that will require it to 
evaluate the veracity of Defendant’s representations that its Hebrew 
National products meet any such religious standard.”51 And while the Eighth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision for lack of standing—and 
remanded the case to state court52—a Minnesota state court reached an 
identical conclusion, holding that “[i]t would be unholy, indeed, for this or 
 
44. Class Action Complaint, supra note 42, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
45. Id. at 17–21. 
46. Id. at 21; see also id. at 38–48 (detailing, inter alia, allegations that the defendant failed to 
implement the correct methods for kosher slaughter, failed to adequately supervise the method of 
slaughter to ensure implementation of kosher slaughter, failed to adequately inspect the meat after 
slaughter to ensure compliance with kosher standards, and failed to clean the meat in a manner that 
adhered to kosher standards). 
47. Id. at 39–40. 
48. Id. at 46–64. 
49. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, 
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2013) (No. 0:12-cv-01354-DWF-TNL). 
50. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
51. Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 999. 
52. Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2014). 












any other court to substitute its judgment on this purely religious 
question.”53 
In this way, kosher food transactions represent the prototypical challenge 
to the neutral principles of law framework. While the neutral principles 
approach is intended to allow the “peculiar genius of private-law systems”54 
to make room for parties to fashion religious commercial transactions in 
accordance with their shared intentions, the fact that many religious terms 
cannot be translated into secular analogs means that the public law demands 
of the religious question doctrine can threaten to foreclose the possibilities 
afforded by private law. Indeed, this is the knee-jerk reaction of courts when 
encountering religious terminology—because the Establishment Clause 
prohibits judicial resolution of claims implicating religious questions, courts 
dismiss claims implicating religious commercial transactions.55  
The problem with this judicial instinct is that it is often misguided—or, 
at a minimum, triggered far too hastily. In a variety of circumstances, private 
law tools provide ready alternatives for courts to resolve religious disputes 
over religious commercial transactions without triggering the constitutional 
prohibitions of the Establishment Clause. For example, with respect to 
kosher claims, courts can use alternative forms of evidence to determine the 
parties’ shared understanding of what kosher means without plumbing the 
depths of religious doctrine. Thus, in the Hebrew National litigation, the 
Eighth Circuit might have considered the use of the term “kosher” in light 
of various contractual aids of interpretation. It could have considered the 
consistency of Hebrew National’s implementation of its kosher standards 
under the course-of-dealing rubric for contract interpretation56—a point 
made by the plaintiffs in their brief on the motion to dismiss.57 And the court 
might have considered the commercial standards for kosher certification 
under the rubric of trade usage—standards that have become relatively 
uniform as a result of various market pressures.58 Both of these options 
would have allowed the court to use private law techniques to determine the 
 
53. Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 19HA-CV-12-3237, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 
6, 2014).  
54. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
55. Barak Richman and I have previously discussed this trend, which we refer to as 
“Establishment Clause creep.” See Helfand & Richman, supra note 1, at 803–10. 
56. See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD 
81–84 (2013) (describing why the kosher certification adopted by Hebrew National has become an 
industry outsider). 
57. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16–
19, Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2013) (No. 0:12-cv-01354-DWF-
TNL).  
58. For discussion of the commercial reasons for uniformity of standards in the kosher 
certification market, see LYTTON, supra note 56, at 132–34 (explaining how the interdependence of the 













meaning of kosher without interrogating the underlying theological claims. 
And by avoiding the underlying theological claims—and leveraging 
“neutral principles of law” such as course of dealing and trade usage—a 
court could have addressed the plaintiffs’ claims without simply closing up 
shop in light of public law’s looming Establishment Clause demands.  
And what is true for kosher litigation is true in other contexts of religious 
commerce. Consider houses of worship—and, in particular, Orthodox 
Jewish synagogues—which have repeatedly provided additional examples 
of this potential, but all-too-often neglected, private law methodology.  
Traditionally, Orthodox Jewish synagogues have maintained separate 
sex seating during prayer services with a partition—or mehitzah—dividing 
the sanctuary into different sections for men and women.59 However, over 
the course of the twentieth century, a variety of synagogues altered this 
practice, integrating the sanctuary to allow for “mixed seating”—that is, 
allowing men and women to sit together.60 This shift in practice, not 
surprisingly, led to some backlash from traditionalists who objected to these 
changes. What is noteworthy, for our purposes, is that these theological 
battles spilled over into the courtroom on a number of occasions. In the most 
frequent fact-pattern, a minority of congregants filed lawsuits seeking to 
enjoin the synagogue from implementing these sanctuary seating changes.61  
One can see how, at first glance, this sort of case would appear outside 
the range of cases that civil courts ought to address, given the limitations 
imposed by the religious question doctrine. How can a state court address 
the legality of a synagogue altering its prayer practices? Surely entering any 
sort of judgment would run afoul of the religious question doctrine.  
And yet, courts engaged this question on private law grounds, resisting 
the impulse to foreclose these claims because of lurking public law 
concerns. Thus, in Katz v. Singerman, the Supreme Court of Louisiana faced 
dueling claims over the legality of an Orthodox Jewish synagogue changing 
its practice from separate seating to mixed seating.62 At the core of the 
dispute in Katz was an express trust whereby the original grantor, Benjamin 
Rosenberg, donated property to the Chevra Thilim Congregation on 
 
59. Norma Baumel Joseph, Mehitzah: Halakhic Decisions and Political Consequences, in 
DAUGHTERS OF THE KING: WOMEN AND THE SYNAGOGUE 117, 128 (Susan Grossman & Rivka Haut 
eds., 1992) (“For the past 150 years, all Orthodox responsa have consistently maintained the mehitzah 
requirement.”); see generally Jonathan D. Sarna, The Debate over Mixed Seating in the American 
Synagogue, in THE AMERICAN SYNAGOGUE: A SANCTUARY TRANSFORMED 363 (Jack Wertheimer ed., 
1987). 
60. Joseph, supra note 59, at 128 (“It was not until the 1950s that the debate became a central 
focus of the denominational divisions, and stands that were taken became frozen principles of faith.”). 
61. See, e.g., Davis v. Scher, 97 N.W.2d 137 (Mich. 1959); Katz v. Singerman, 127 So. 2d 515 
(La. 1961). 
62. Katz, 127 So. 2d at 517. 












condition that, among other things, the building would “only be used as a 
place of Jewish worship according to the strict ancient and orthodox forms 
and ceremonies.”63 Moreover, the Board of Directors, accepting the 
donation from Rosenberg, did so on condition that, among other things, the 
building would be used “for the worship of God according to the Orthodox 
Polish Jewish Ritual.”64 When the congregation subsequently considered 
passing a resolution to permit mixed seating, plaintiffs sought an injunction, 
arguing that such a practice would fail to qualify as “worship according to 
the strict ancient and orthodox forms” or “Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual” 
and thus would violate the conditions of the donation.65 
While the court refused to enjoin the resolution,66 its focus was not on 
public law constraints on resolving religious questions, but on private law 
considerations of enforcing an express trust. Thus, instead of focusing on 
the theological terms in the express trust, the court focused on the donor’s 
presumable original intent in making his donation to the synagogue. In turn, 
and in light of conflicting testimony as to whether Orthodox Judaism 
permitted mixed synagogue seating,67 the court concluded that the original 
donor agreement could not be enforced. But in so doing, the court rendered 
its judgment not because it was prohibited from evaluating theological 
terminology like “Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual,” but because the terms of 
the express trust were insufficiently definite, clear, or specific to prevent the 
proposed seating changes to the sanctuary.68 In this way, the court’s overall 
inquiry focused on donor intent—and not theology—when determining 
whether or not to enforce the donor agreement so as to prevent changes to 
seating in the synagogue sanctuary.69 Thus, while the court did not 
ultimately vindicate the plaintiff’s claims, it at least rendered a verdict on 
the merits by interpreting the actual express trust. 
Similarly, in Davis v. Scher, the Supreme Court of Michigan addressed 
the claims of congregants objecting to the sanctuary seating change.70 
 
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 518. 
65. Id. at 519. 
66. Id. at 534. 
67. Id. at 532. 
68. Id. at 533. 
69. The court might have done well to take this private law inquiry one step further by inquiring 
as to the actual donor’s intent with respect to what he intended as opposed to what the court could 
“reasonabl[y] . . . presume” about the donor’s intent. Id. at 532 (emphasis added). Still, the court’s 
general approach still focused on private law consideration as opposed to public law restrictions. 
For other analogous instances where courts made recourse to private law doctrines in order to 
adjudicate claims related to the meaning of Orthodox Judaism, see Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 
832 P.2d 1007 (Colo. App. 1991); Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Stern, 491 N.Y.S.2d 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
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However, in contrast to Katz, the court in Davis found in the plaintiffs’ favor 
because, in its view, the congregation had been held in an implied trust to 
be used as an Orthodox Jewish synagogue—and “it is the duty of the courts 
to see that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which has 
been thus attached to its use.”71 One might imagine, viewing this case 
through a public law frame, that a court would not be able to establish 
whether the property was held in an implied trust as an Orthodox synagogue 
because doing so would require investigating a theological question. But the 
court approached the historical record through a private law lens and looked 
to evidence of the congregation’s past practice as an “Orthodox synagogue” 
all the way back to the drafting of the initial synagogue constitution.72 
Indeed, according to evidence presented at trial, all the rabbis of the 
synagogue had previously described themselves as Orthodox rabbis and 
affiliated with Orthodox rabbinical organizations; furthermore, the 
synagogue had originally been constructed with a balcony to facilitate 
separate seating for men and women.73 In this way, the court took a uniquely 
private law approach—examining the past practices of the synagogue to 
establish a trust—to conclude that the property was held in an implied trust 
as an “Orthodox” synagogue, instead of simply dismissing the case on 
constitutional grounds.  
Of course, using private law techniques—looking to historical evidence 
as opposed to theological evidence—to support the existence of an implied 
trust for an “Orthodox synagogue” still left a religious question before the 
court; does functioning as an “Orthodox synagogue” allow mixed seating? 
To address this question, the court could have looked to the same historical 
record—the synagogue’s past practice of having separate seating for men 
and women in the sanctuary—to determine the content of the implied trust; 
however, in Davis, the defendants refused to submit any evidence 
supporting the view that Orthodox Judaism permitted integrating the 
sanctuary.74 This left the plaintiffs’ assertion that Orthodox Judaism 
required separate seating uncontroverted.75 As a result, the court could find 
in favor of the plaintiffs without choosing one interpretation of religious 
doctrine over the other. In turn, because the court was able to use private 
law techniques—examining the record of past practices in the synagogue 
without interrogating the theology of Orthodox Judaism—to establish the 
existence of an implied trust, it could then adjudicate the case and determine 
 
71. Id. at 143 (quoting 45 AM. JUR. Religious Societies § 61). 
72. Id. at 140. 
73. Id. at 139–41. 
74. Id. at 141. 
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that the congregation was required to maintain prayer services in accordance 
with its past practices.  
This judicial willingness to leave space for private law exploration of 
terms like “Orthodox Jewish” practice has not been merely relegated to 
church property cases. For example, in Fisher v. Congregation B’Nai 
Yitzhok, a Jewish congregation and Herman Fisher entered into a contract 
whereby Fisher would officiate at the synagogue as a cantor.76 However, 
subsequent to the execution of the agreement, the synagogue—described in 
its charter as worshiping in accordance with the “faith, discipline, forms and 
rites of the orthodox Jewish religion”77—partially modified its practice of 
separate seating, allowing both men and women to sit together in all but the 
first eight rows of the sanctuary.78 Upon learning of this change, Fisher—
an Orthodox Jewish cantor—informed the synagogue he could not officiate 
during their services because doing so would violate his religious 
commitments.79 Because he learned of this shortly before the 1950 Jewish 
holiday season, Fisher was unable to find other comparable work. 
Therefore, he filed suit against the synagogue to recoup his lost wages.80  
Like in Davis and Katz, the court in Fisher could have conflated the 
contract dispute with the underlying religious question as to what types of 
seating arrangements were theologically possible under an Orthodox Jewish 
umbrella. Instead, the court in Fisher focused on the subjective intent of the 
parties, noting that the rabbi of the congregation had reaffirmed to Fisher at 
the time they entered the agreement the synagogue’s status as an Orthodox 
Jewish synagogue, that the synagogue had always maintained separate 
seating, and that this policy would continue in the future.81 This evidence 
allowed the court to find in favor of Fisher, concluding that the synagogue 
had breached the agreement because it violated a shared understanding of 
the agreement “in the light of custom or immemorial and invariable 
usage.”82 Here, again, a court side-stepped the religious question doctrine 
by relying on evidence and testimony that spoke to the intent of the parties 
and the contracting context. And in so doing, it leveraged private law to 
make space for commercial arrangements without simply dismissing the 
case on public law grounds.  
The fundamental problem, as cases like ConAgra demonstrate, is that the 
judicial willingness to rely on private law alternatives is far too uneven. 
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Indeed, in the extreme, courts will refuse to adjudicate cases at the nexus of 
religion and private law even where there is no actual dispute as to the 
meaning of the underlying theological terms. As a prime example, consider 
Abdelhak v. Jewish Press.83 In Abdelhak, the plaintiff was an Orthodox 
Jewish doctor, specializing in high-risk obstetrics, who sued a Jewish 
newspaper for defamation, stemming from the publishing of his name on a 
list of individuals against whom a rabbinical court had issued a seruv84—
that is, a rabbinic contempt order. According to the listing in the newspaper, 
the seruv was issued against the plaintiff for his failure to divorce his wife 
in accordance with Jewish Law.85  
However, the parties agreed that the inclusion of the doctor’s name on 
the list was a mistake and the paper issued a retraction, explaining that the 
error was based upon misinformation from the rabbinical court.86 This error 
was particularly damaging to the plaintiff because his patients were “almost 
without exception, women of the Orthodox Jewish faith.”87 As a result, the 
plaintiff alleged that his reputation within the religious community—and, in 
turn, his medical practice—was severely damaged by the newspaper’s 
erroneous report of his religious misdeeds.88  
The court, however, still held that adjudicating the plaintiff’s claim 
would violate the Establishment Clause.89 This outcome can best be 
described as bizarre given that the court did not need, under the 
circumstances, to consider the truth or falsity of the published statement as 
all parties agreed that the defamatory statement was, in fact, false.90 Thus, 
the typical obstacle present in cases of religious defamation—the truth or 
falsity of the allegedly defamatory claim—did not apply in Abdelhak. That 
notwithstanding, the court quoted from Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim—
yet another religious defamation case—where a federal court concluded that 
there need not be “competing theological propositions” in order to trigger 
the religious question doctrine.91 Applying this logic in Abdelhak, however, 
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generated the unfortunate result that the shared factual understanding of the 
parties was rendered insufficient in order to enable the court to resolve the 
private law tort claim. In this way, Abdelhak stands in stark contrast to cases 
such as Davis, where the lack of competing evidence as to the requirements 
of Orthodox Judaism enabled the court to interpret the content of an implied 
trust that might otherwise have been beyond its enforcement power. 
All told, in a variety of circumstances, courts might interrogate the 
intentions of the parties, their shared understandings, or the relevant 
commercial context to adjudicate cases at the intersection of religion and 
commerce. This approach could cover a range of commercial cases—
purchases of religious goods and services, liability for torts within religious 
commercial relationships, and religious property restrictions. In such cases, 
courts should avail themselves of their private law toolkit—examining 
industry practices, shared commercial understandings, and subjective intent 
of key parties—so as to avoid unreflective application of public law’s 
religious question doctrine. To be sure, this does not mean that courts will 
be able to adjudicate all claims of religious commerce. But without 
exploring what private law can allow, public law’s prohibitions will short 
circuit too many cases where courts could have played the role for which 
they were intended—providing victims of legal wrongs with appropriate 
legal remedies. 
III. ARBITRATING RELIGIOUS COMMERCE 
That courts overestimate the demands of public law does not mean that 
all is lost. Private law does, in principle, afford those pursuing religious 
forms of commerce with an alternative to avoid the encroachment of 
Establishment Clause constraints.92 When entering contracts for religious 
commerce, parties can include religious arbitration provisions and religious 
choice-of-law provisions in religious commercial contracts to ensure that 
any disputes are resolved by a religious tribunal in accordance with religious 
law. Although it is by no means a panacea,93 parties can thereby submit 
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disputes before a religious tribunal that might have otherwise been 
erroneously dismissed in court on constitutional grounds—and the award of 
the tribunal would be legally enforceable like any other arbitration award. 
Given these advantages—and the overall pro-arbitration stance of the 
Supreme Court94—it is not surprising that courts have uniformly rejected 
claims that legal enforcement of religious arbitration agreements and 
awards violate the First Amendment.95 Thus, courts have largely regulated 
arbitration through private law mechanisms just like all other forms of 
arbitration. However, recent years have seen rising discontent among 
scholars regarding the potential consequences of religious arbitration. In 
turn, there is a growing body of literature arguing that courts should 
leverage public law mechanisms—flowing from the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment—to regulate religious forms of arbitration.96 Like the 
impulse with respect to religious contracts generally, this turn from private 
law to public law would be a mistake. 
Current arbitration doctrine allows judicial intervention in the arbitral 
system at two primary stages. At the first stage, courts interpret arbitration 
agreements to determine whether it must compel parties to submit a dispute 
to the mutually agreed upon arbitration tribunal.97 According to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration agreements are only unenforceable on 
“such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,”98 such as unconscionability, duress, or any other common law 
contract defenses.99 In this way, the method for states to regulate arbitration 
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agreements is via “general contract law principles.”100 Conversely, “[w]hat 
States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its 
basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its 
arbitration clause.”101 Put differently, arbitration provisions must be placed 
on “the same footing as other contracts,”102 whereby invalidating such 
provisions can only be done by identifying one of the standard private law 
defenses available under state contract doctrine. In turn, “the first task of a 
court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”103 
At the second stage, courts are sometimes asked to either confirm an 
arbitral award—and thereby render the award legally enforceable104—or 
alternatively vacate the award—and thereby reject the tribunal’s decision.105 
Courts may only vacate awards based upon the grounds provided by the 
FAA.106 These grounds primarily focus on ensuring that the arbitral process 
is fundamentally fair; accordingly, awards must be vacated where the court 
can identify some sort of corruption, fraud, bias or misconduct on the part 
of the arbitrators—or where the arbitrators exceeded their powers in 
rendering the award.107 This review ensures that the arbitration proceedings 
both meet the contractual expectations of the parties and adhere to the 
legally mandated procedural standards.  
Courts have uniformly held that enforcing religious forms of arbitration 
does not trigger First Amendment concerns because of the limited nature of 
the twin judicial inquiries with respect to enforcing arbitration—both 
enforcing agreements and confirming awards.108 On the front end, when 
courts determine whether or not to compel arbitration, the calculus avoids 
any constitutionally prohibited inquiries; all courts must do is ask “whether 
the parties have an enforceable agreement to arbitrate and, if so, whether the 
underlying dispute between the parties falls within the scope of the 
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agreement.”109 Thus, “[o]rdinary contract principles determine who is 
bound by written arbitration provisions.”110 These sorts of threshold 
questions ensure that a court, in assessing whether parties have previously 
agreed to submit a dispute to binding arbitration, need not “determine, or 
even address, any aspect of the parties’ underlying dispute.”111 And by 
avoiding the underlying merits of the dispute, courts ensure that they can 
compel religious forms of arbitration without adjudicating prohibited 
religious questions. 
The same generally holds true when courts decide whether or not to 
confirm an arbitration award. In such circumstances, courts are charged in 
the first instance with ensuring compliance with statutory procedural 
requirements;112 the court, with rare exception,113 may not review the merits 
of an arbitration award.114 As a result, when courts confirm a religious 
arbitration award, there is no need to consider the religious matters 
underlying the award that are beyond the constitutional authority of courts 
to adjudicate.115 Thus, courts regulate religious arbitration—like all other 
forms of arbitration—via the mechanisms laid out by the FAA.  
In recent years, however, journalists and commentators have criticized 
this uniform judicial enforcement of religious arbitration, arguing that the 
system lacks sufficient safeguards against abuse. In one of the most 
prominent critiques of religious arbitration, a New York Times article 
presented a harsh assessment of why religious institutions make use of 
religious arbitration: “religious arbitration may have less to do with 
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honoring a set of beliefs than with controlling legal outcomes.”116 And, in 
turn, the article explored cases emblematic of an ostensibly larger trend 
where “judges have consistently upheld religious arbitrations over secular 
objections.”117 Other critical assessments followed. For example, critics 
argued that religious arbitration is a tool through which “religious groups 
have attempted to use the legal system to impose their beliefs on others”;118 
that religious arbitration is rigged because “churches use a faith-based 
system that’s already rigged in their favor”;119 and that religious arbitration 
undermines the principle of church-state separation by “giving judicial 
effect to . . . a religious pronouncement using the court as a mouthpiece of 
religion.”120 
These criticisms have, subsequently, made their way into the legal 
literature, with authors arguing that the private law mechanisms 
incorporated into current arbitration doctrine provide insufficient 
protections when parties enter the religious arbitration system. At bottom, 
these authors argue that religious arbitration represents an adjudicative 
regime where arbitrators enforce religious legal rules that, at times, conflict 
with state and federal law. Importantly, these authors contend that existing 
private law protections are inadequate to protect parties to religious 
arbitration because enforcing those protections invariably requires courts to 
address prohibited religious questions.  
As the primary example, these authors identify the manner in which the 
unconscionability doctrine is defanged when deployed in the context of 
religious arbitration. Thus, Jeff Dasteel has argued that parties subjected to 
contracts of adhesion—already in a weaker bargaining position—cannot 
access the standard protections afforded by the unconscionability 
doctrine.121 This is because assessing the existence of substantive 
unconscionability will, invariably, require interrogation of religious 
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he-growth-of-religious-arbitration-clauses [https://perma.cc/4N9Q-JNU8]. 
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1/03/new-york-times-reveals-how-religious-arbitration-cases-work-against-the-powerless/ [https://per 
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questions in violation of the First Amendment.122 Similarly, Sophia Chua-
Rubenfeld and Frank Costa have argued that “the strong presumptions in 
favor of arbitration and against inquiring into substantive Church law pose 
obstacles to proving either prong of an unconscionability claim.”123 
To see how this dynamic works, Dasteel as well as Chua-Rubenfeld and 
Costa cite Garcia v. Church of Scientology—a lawsuit filed by Maria and 
Luis Garcia, alleging fraud and breach of contract claims against the Church 
of Scientology.124 The church, however, argued that all such claims were 
subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the 
parties. The Garcias, for their part, claimed that the agreement was 
unconscionable because the arbitration agreement required that the 
arbitrators all be church members “in good standing with the Mother 
Church.”125 In light of church doctrine,126 the Garcias contended that the 
arbitration could not be fair or neutral if the arbitrators themselves were 
committed members of the Church of Scientology.127  
In its order compelling arbitration, the Florida federal district held that it 
could not address the Garcias’ claim of unconscionability because “it 
necessarily would require an analysis and interpretation of Scientology 
doctrine. That would constitute a prohibited intrusion into religious 
doctrine, discipline, faith, and ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law by the 
court.”128 And because the court deemed evaluating the claim to be 
constitutionally prohibited, it was required to enforce the agreement, 
notwithstanding the potential consequences for an inherently biased 
arbitration. In the words of the court, it had to enforce the agreement, 
regardless of how “compelling . . . Plaintiffs’ argument might otherwise 
be.”129 
Critics have taken this case to expose the fundamental failings of 
religious arbitration.130 But much of the case’s outcome is the result of 
 
122. Id. at 63. 
123. Sophia Chua-Rubenfeld & Frank J. Costa, Jr., Comment, The Reverse-Entanglement 
Principle: Why Religious Arbitration of Federal Rights Is Unconstitutional, 128 YALE L.J. 2087, 2101 
(2019). 
124. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 178033 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015). 
125. Id. at *7, *32–33. 
126. For example, the Garcias argued that they had been deemed “suppressive individuals,” and 
therefore members in good standing with the church must “disconnect,” and therefore shun, them. Id. at 
*32. 
127. It is worth noting that the Garcias’ case is not the only one of its kind. See, e.g., Order, 
Schippers v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., No. 11-11250-CI-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2012). 
128. Garcia, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178033, at *33. 
129. Id. 
130. See Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2100–01; Dasteel, supra note 121, at 56–
58; Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 116 (discussing the Garcia case). 












misapplication of current arbitration doctrine. Under current doctrine, 
arbitrator neutrality is part of the very definition of arbitration.131 Without 
it, the enforcement of arbitration proceedings becomes a sham—a method 
to suppress claims as opposed to expand access to justice.  
Courts police this requirement in multiple ways. First, lack of neutral 
arbitrators can invalidate an arbitration agreement because “a third party 
decision maker and some decree of impartiality must exist for a dispute 
resolution mechanism to constitute arbitration.”132 Accordingly, failure of 
an arbitrator selection process to ensure neutrality would constitute “a[n 
employer’s] complete default of its contractual obligation to draft 
arbitration rules and to do so in good faith.”133 In addition, the lack of neutral 
arbitrators can also support a court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration 
provision on unconscionability grounds.134 Indeed, this is one of the many 
ways that unconscionability plays a vital “safety net” role,135 leading to the 
disproportionate success of such claims in court.136 Finally, courts can 
 
131. Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
132. Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996) (collecting cases). 
133. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999). 
134. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Timberquest Park at Magic, L.L.C., 116 F. Supp. 3d 422 (D. Vt. 2015); 
Velasquez v. S.B. Rest. Co., No. 2:10-cv-00140-GMN-PAL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124453, at *7–8 
(D. Nev. Nov. 9, 2010). 
135. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 
73 (2006). 
136. For articles discussing the success of unconscionability in the arbitration context, see Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal 
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to 
Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 469; Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249 
(2006); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The 
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004). 
It is worth noting that, in more recent years, the Supreme Court has attempted to push back against 
these trends, expressing concern about statistical evidence demonstrating that “California’s courts have 
been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts.” AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011). Still, notwithstanding the Court’s recent interventions 
regarding the applicability of unconscionability to arbitration, there is good reason to think that 
unconscionability remains a significant safety-net doctrine. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, Concepcion and 
Mis-Concepcion: Why Unconscionability Survives the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 
2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 225; Michael A. Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion 
Covers Less than You Think, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 126 (2013); see also Steven G. Pearl, The 
Conscience of Arbitration: Lower Courts Have Held that Unconscionability Analysis Survives the U.S. 













vacate an arbitration award “where there was evident partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrators, or either of them.”137  
Garcia, critics argue, presents a problem because a court would not have 
been able to assess the neutrality of the selected arbitrators without making 
a constitutionally prohibited inquiry into religious doctrine. But this 
conclusion—one advanced by the court in Garcia—reverses the 
presumptions of the doctrine as applied to arbitrator selection. To see how, 
consider a 2007 New York Surrogate Court case, Matter of Ismailoff, where 
the court addressed an executed irrevocable inter vivos trust138 that included 
the following arbitration provision:  
In the event that any dispute or question arises with respect to this 
Declaration of Trust, such dispute or question shall be submitted to 
arbitration before a panel consisting of three persons of the Orthodox 
Jewish faith, which will enforce the provisions of this Declaration of 
Trust and give any party the rights he is entitled to under New York 
law.139  
The parties subsequently disputed the enforceability of the trust and one 
of the parties sought to initiate arbitration proceedings. However, the New 
York court concluded that the arbitrator qualification provision was 
unenforceable, holding that the First Amendment, which prohibits courts 
“from resolving issues concerning religious doctrine and practice,”140 
rendered the provision requiring the selection of three arbitrators of 
Orthodox Jewish faith unenforceable.141 Because the First Amendment 
prohibits inquiry into religious questions, the court simply could not enforce 
the arbitrator qualification clause; doing so would have ultimately required 
judicial analysis over which prospective arbitrators were “of the Orthodox 
Jewish faith.”142  
 
137. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(2) (2018). It is worth noting that attempts to vacate awards on evident 
partiality grounds on the basis of structural bias are rarely successful. See, e.g., Harter v. Iowa Grain 
Co., 220 F.3d 544, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases on structural bias). 
138. In re Ismailoff, No. 342207, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 1, 2007).  
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 2. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. This problem can be avoided by submitting a dispute to a third-party religious arbitration 
service provider. See, e.g., Sample Arbitration Provision, BETH DIN AM. (2018), https://bethdin.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Contractual-Arbitration-Provision.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS7Z-HX88] (“Any 
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof . . . shall be settled 
by arbitration by the Beth Din of America (www.bethdin.org), in accordance with its Rules and 
Procedures.”). By contractually authorizing a particular service provider to resolve the dispute in 
accordance with its own institutional rules, the parties can incorporate a provision that lacks any religious 
terminology, but still enable the religious arbitration service provider to select arbitrators who are experts 
in religious law. See, e.g., Rules and Procedures, BETH DIN AM. § 1 (2019), https://bethdin.org/wp-cont 












This analysis ought to have controlled the outcome in Garcia. 
Determining which prospective arbitrators were “in good standing with the 
Mother Church”143 presumably would require interrogation of religious 
doctrine, given that it seems most likely that interpreting and applying that 
standard both entails identifying what religious behaviors are necessary for 
good standing and then applying those religious standards to prospective 
arbitrators. As a result, it would be unconstitutional to enforce the arbitrator 
qualification clause—just as it was in Matter of Ismailoff.  
One can imagine the Church of Scientology responding with the 
following counterargument: the arbitrator qualification provision in Garcia 
does not require adjudication of a religious question, but simply requires 
asking the church whether the proposed arbitrators satisfied the theological 
requirements of good standing. The problem with this argument is that it 
would empower one party to determine which prospective arbitrators are, 
and which are not, eligible to serve as members of the arbitral tribunal. And 
granting one party authority to either control the arbitrator selection process 
or to circumscribe the pool of eligible arbitrators renders an arbitration 
provision unconscionable precisely because it threatens to undermine the 
neutrality of the arbitration panel.144 Indeed, granting the Church of 
Scientology final say over which arbitrators satisfied the “in good standing” 
requirement is particularly problematic given that no court could ever 
review the church’s determination because of the religious question 
doctrine. 
But the force of this argument goes one step further. Once a court has 
invalidated an arbitrator qualification or selection provision, there remains 
a question of remedy: should the court invalidate the entirety of the 
arbitration provision and have the dispute moved to a civil court, or should 
it simply sever the arbitrator qualification provision and use standard 
statutory procedures for judicial appointment of alternative arbitrators? The 
court in Matter of Ismailoff chose the latter option, although that likely was 
an error.145 Well-settled arbitration doctrine, at least under the FAA, 
instructs courts to invalidate the entirety of the arbitration agreement where 
the arbitrator is unavailable and “the designation of the arbitrator was 
 
ent/uploads/2019/08/RulesandProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A8W-DCS6] [hereinafter Rules, BETH 
DIN AM.]. 
143. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 178033, at *7, *32–33 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015). 
144. See Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2014); Hooters 
of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999); Dasteel, supra note 121, at 58 (discussing 
the holding of Zaborowski). 














‘integral’ to the arbitration provision [and not] merely an ancillary 
consideration.”146 In cases of religious arbitration, it is quite likely that the 
arbitrator qualification provision is integral to the agreement given the ex 
ante preferences of the parties. Thus, in Garcia, there is good reason to think 
correct application of current arbitration doctrine should have led the court 
to invalidate the entire arbitration agreement. The court, however, did 
otherwise; unfortunately, incorrect application of the law often leads to 
dangerous consequences.147 
Of course, Garcia is just one example—even if it is the recurring and 
favorite example of religious arbitration critics. Critics also argue that 
already-existing private law defenses remain inadequate because a religious 
arbitration tribunal might apply religious law in a manner that would 
contravene the very substantive and procedural protections that civil law 
provides.  
This worry plays out in a couple of different ways. First, with respect to 
substantive law, religious arbitrators might fail to apply the applicable 
substantive legal rules to the dispute before them. This worry, in and of 
itself, is not unique to religious arbitration.148 But the unique version of the 
worry flows from the fact that religious arbitration, by its very definition, 
requires arbitrators to “prioritize holy law over federal statutory law.”149 
Indeed, many choice-of-law provisions explicitly require religious 
arbitrators to apply religious law to the submitted dispute.150 This 
 
146. Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App’x 
174, 176 (5th Cir. 2010); Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When a court 
asks whether a choice of forum is integral, it asks whether the whole arbitration agreement becomes 
unenforceable if the chosen arbitrator cannot or will not act.”); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 
F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000); Gutfreund v. Weiner (In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative Litig.), 
68 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 1995). But see Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 793 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (rejecting the “integral-part” test and concluding “[c]ourts should not use uncertainty in just 
how that would be accomplished to defeat the evident choice. Section 5 allows judges to supply details 
in order to make arbitration work”). 
147. In this context, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa also worry that “[o]ther litigants are likely to fare 
even worse than did the Garcias” because many religious tribunals “have well-established and well-
publicized rules of procedure, which will undermine a litigant’s claim of procedural unconscionability” 
and illusory promise. Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2101–02 (footnote omitted). It is far 
from clear, however, that parties to religious arbitration agreements would be worse off because of these 
developments. Creating clear and well-established rules of procedure would appear to be a positive 
development—precisely the types of steps the law ought to incentivize in order to ensure a predictable 
and transparent arbitral process. 
148. See generally Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 
(1961) (providing empirical evidence that the overwhelming majority of arbitrators believe they have 
authority to deviate from the applicable legal rules). 
149. Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2096.  
150. See, e.g., Rules, BETH DIN AM., supra note 142, § 3(a) (“In the absence of an agreement by 
the parties, arbitration by the Beth Din shall take the form of compromise or settlement related to Jewish 
law (p’shara krova l’din), in each case as determined by a majority of the panel designated by the Beth 
Din, unless the parties in writing select an alternative Jewish law process of resolution.”); Rules of 












possibility, argue critics, is most “striking” in the context of 
“discrimination”151 because “the doctrines of civil rights arbitration and 
religious arbitration collide in a way that severely threatens parties who 
have suffered discrimination.”152  
Two primary doctrines protect against arbitrators applying contractual 
choice-of-law provisions and thereby ignoring vital substantive legal rules. 
First, on the front end, a court cannot compel arbitration of claims 
implicating federal statutory claims where it concludes that one of the 
parties will not be able to “effectively . . . vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum.”153 Thus, courts will not enforce arbitration 
agreements which include a choice-of-law provision where “choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operate[] in tandem as a prospective 
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”154 Second, on the 
back end, choice-of-law provisions are invalid “if the substituted law . . . 
contradict[s] the public policy of the forum state.”155 As a result, if 
arbitrators enforce a choice-of-law provision that violates public policy, the 
 
Procedure for Christian Conciliation, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, Rule 4 (Jan. 2019), https://w 
ww.instituteforchristianconciliation.com/ICC_Rules_v2019Jan.pdf [https://perma.cc/74YQ-GTR9]. 
According to its rule, the Beth Din of America will typically enforce choice-of-law provisions 
identifying state law as governing a dispute. See Rules, BETH DIN AM., supra note 142, § 3(d) (“[T]he 
Beth Din will accept such a choice of law clause as providing the rules of decision governing the decision 
of the panel to the fullest extent permitted by Jewish Law.”); see also Yaacov Feit, The Prohibition 
Against Going to Secular Courts, 1 J. BETH DIN AM. 30, 41 (2012); Yona Reiss, Matneh Al Mah 
She’Katuv Ba’Torah Bi’Davar She’Bimammon )ןוממבש רבדב הרותב בותכש המ לע הנתמ( , 4 SHA’AREI 
TZEDEK )קדצ ירעש(  288, 295 (2003). 
151. Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2088. 
152. Id. at 2120. 
153. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985); see 
also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–90 (2000) (reiterating the “effective 
vindication” doctrine, but finding it inapplicable given the underlying facts before the Court); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (same); see generally Thomas J. Lilly, Jr., The 
Use of Arbitration Agreements to Defeat Federal Statutory Rights: What Remains of the Effective 
Vindication Doctrine After American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 299 
(2016).  
154. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. 
It is worth noting that Mitsubishi Motors also gives rise to the “second look” doctrine, which—while 
infrequently used—might potentially be deployed in the religious arbitration context. See Donald 
Francis Donovan & Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Mitsubishi After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules 
Before Courts and International Arbitrators, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 11, 54 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006). 
155. 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.7 (2019); see also id. §§ 79.7 n.1, 83.9 n.2 (collecting cases). 
The use of the public policy exception to invalidate a choice-of-law provision in an arbitration agreement 
is fundamentally different than using public policy to invalidate an arbitration award. Most notably, it is 
not subject—to the extent it applies to public policy—to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel that courts may only vacate awards on statutory grounds. See Hall St. Assocs. v. 













award can be vacated by a court because enforcement of the award would 
violate public policy.156  
It is true that these two doctrines might be difficult to apply in the context 
of religious arbitration. To invalidate an arbitration agreement because, in 
tandem with an arbitration provision, it prevented the effective vindication 
of federal statutory rights would require a judicial determination as to the 
content of the religious law in question. Where a party sought to compel 
arbitration based upon an agreement that required arbitrators to apply 
religious law, a court would typically be unable to evaluate prior to 
arbitration proceedings whether the religious law in question violated state 
public policy or prevented effective vindication of federal statutory rights 
without resolving a constitutionally prohibited religious question.157 
Similarly, a court asked to confirm a religious arbitration award would not 
be able to inquire into the theological content of the selected body of 
religious law to determine whether application of that body of religious law 
violated public policy. 
Second, with respect to procedural law, the religious question doctrine 
threatens to leave courts unable to enforce the typical procedural protections 
available to parties in religious arbitration. Or, put in more extreme terms, 
“religious arbitrations are all but unreviewable under the [FAA] because 
courts will not review ecclesiastic rules or procedures for fairness.”158 Most 
concerning to critics is the possibility that the religious question would 
handcuff courts in their application of the unconscionability doctrine159—a 
doctrine that has ensured arbitral rules and procedures accord with general 
conceptions of arbitral justice.160 This challenge stems from the structure of 
unconscionability doctrine;161 courts applying unconscionability doctrine 
 
156. The initial interpretation and application of the choice-of-law provision would be for the 
arbitrators to decide. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 80 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (describing how only challenges to “the arbitration agreement itself” are for the court to 
decide). 
157. Oddly enough, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa remain open to the possibility that “[r]eligious 
arbitration of secular statutory rights may well be a rare example of ineffective vindication” without 
considering the impact of the religious question doctrine on the scope of its applicability. Chua-
Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2104.  
158. Dasteel, supra note 121, at 51. 
159. Id. at 62; Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2101. 
160. See generally Schmitz, supra note 135. As a number of scholars have demonstrated, courts 
have been particularly keen on deploying the unconscionability doctrine in the context of arbitration. 
See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 136, at 1440–41 (describing statistical data on rise in application of 
unconscionability doctrine in arbitration cases); Randall, supra note 136, at 194–96 (summarizing 
statistics on increase in use of unconscionability doctrine in arbitration cases). 
161. Worldwide Underwriters Ins. v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“Unconscionability requires a two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are unreasonably 
favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding 
acceptance of the provisions.”); see generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code¾The 












require parties to demonstrate both “procedural unconscionability”—that is, 
unconscionability that flows from the bargaining process162—and 
“substantive unconscionability”—that is, “contractual terms that are 
unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored 
party does not assent.”163 While courts, when asked to compel arbitration, 
can evaluate whether a religious arbitration agreement is procedurally 
unconscionable by simply assessing the existence of failures in the 
bargaining process, judicial application of substantive unconscionability 
presents a more formidable problem; in the words of one critic, “[b]ecause 
[a] court could not (and should not) become entangled in the religious 
doctrines . . . [a] court could make no ruling on whether the [arbitral] 
procedures are substantively unconscionable.”164 In this way, as with 
doctrines policing the substance of choice-of-law provisions, the religious 
question doctrine presents an obstacle to courts when determining whether 
or not to enforce an arbitration agreement precisely because it requires 
inquiry into the content of religious law; without evaluating the content of 
religious law, there would be no way to determine whether its provisions 
are sufficiently one-sided to trigger an unconscionability defense. 
No doubt these criticisms present an important challenge to the vitality 
of religious arbitration. But by adapting current private law doctrine to these 
unique conditions, courts can leverage existing doctrinal tools to plug legal 
holes generated by public law. Indeed, while these criticisms—both with 
respect to substantive as well as procedural protections—are accurate when 
a court first evaluates the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, they 
fail to provide a complete picture of how private law protections might 
become available later in the arbitration proceedings. While a court may 
not—prior to the onset of arbitration proceedings—be in a position to 
determine whether religious law will violate public policy, prevent the 
 
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (providing this two-track framework for 
the unconscionability doctrine). 
162. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing procedural 
unconscionability as encompassing inequalities in bargaining power or hidden contractual provisions 
which “preclude[] the weaker party from enjoying a meaningful opportunity to negotiate and choose the 
terms of the contract”); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (defining 
procedural unconscionability as “pertain[ing] to the process by which an agreement is reached and the 
form of an agreement, including the use therein of fine print and convoluted or unclear language”). One 
consideration courts often take into account when assessing procedural unconscionability is whether the 
agreement in question is a contract of adhesion. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 
P.3d 669, 766–67 (Cal. 2000). 
163. Harris, 183 F.3d at 181. Courts have identified a wide range of substantively unconscionable 
terms. See Bruhl, supra note 136, at 1437–39 (listing examples of substantively unconscionable 
contractual terms); see also Stempel, supra note 136, at 803–07 (listing specific traits that may brand 
arbitration agreements as unconscionable).  













effective vindication of federal statutory rules, or render a substantively 
unconscionable result, the application of religious law will ultimately 
expose any such failings. Indeed, once the arbitral tribunal applies religious 
law to the facts of the case, its decisions—both its intermediate 
determinations during the proceedings and its final judgment reflected in its 
award—will demonstrate whether the religious law, as applied, violated 
public policy, frustrated federal statutory rights, or generated a one-sided 
result such that it renders the arbitration agreement unconscionable. In turn, 
during the course of the proceedings, a party will be able to gather the 
information it needs in order to substantiate the very claims previously 
foreclosed by the religious question doctrine.165 
Such back-end legal protections simply require mining current private 
law doctrines with respect to waiver.166 Generally, parties cannot challenge 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement once they have begun 
participating in arbitration proceedings addressing the merits of the 
underlying dispute.167 Accordingly, courts require parties to timely object 
to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement; failure to do so would 
render any claims against the enforceability of the arbitration agreement 
waived.168 In the typical case, the logic is quite understandable:  
A person objecting to arbitration must timely raise the objection so a 
party seeking arbitration can make an informed choice whether to 
pursue arbitration with the risk that the dispute would be found 
nonarbitrable or to abandon arbitration and pursue other remedies. To 
allow a claim of no agreement to arbitrate after the hearing is over 
results in a waste of time and money.169 
Accordingly, to avoid the waiver doctrine, “[a]n objection should occur ‘at 
the earliest possible moment’ to save the time and expense of a possibly 
 
165. As noted above, even in the absence of the religious question doctrine, choice-of-law 
provisions would not be considered prior to the onset of the arbitration proceedings because the 
interpretation and application of such provisions are, as an initial matter, for the arbitrators to decide. 
See supra note 156. 
166. I have explored this argument previously in the context of unconscionability. See Helfand, 
New Multiculturalism, supra note 93, at 1301–03. 
167. See Azcon Constr. Co. v. Golden Hills Resort, 498 N.W.2d 630, 632–33 (S.D. 1993) 
(outlining the various judicial approaches to the waiver doctrine); see generally Eleanor L. Grossman, 
Annotation, Participation in Arbitration Proceedings as Waiver of Objections to Arbitrability Under 
State Law, 56 A.L.R.5th 757 (2019). It is worth noting that states vary in terms of precisely at what point 
the waiver doctrine is triggered. See id. § 2b.  
168. See Grossman, supra note 167, § 2a (“As a general rule, participation in an arbitration 
proceeding on the merits of a dispute will result in a waiver of the right to raise the issue of 
arbitrability.”).  
169. Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Tr. Co., 349 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 













But religious arbitration is far from typical precisely because, prior to the 
arbitration proceedings, courts lack the constitutional capacity to assess 
certain challenges to the religious arbitration agreement’s enforceability. 
Indeed, in the context of religious arbitration, the “earliest possible 
moment” may often be after the onset of arbitration proceedings; given the 
religious question doctrine, parties may not be able to substantiate their 
claims of substantive unconscionability or frustration of federal statutory 
rights until well into the arbitration proceedings.171 In such circumstances, 
courts ought to apply the waiver doctrine in a manner that takes the 
constitutional limitations into account and deem objections to be timely so 
long as they are made as soon as judicially cognizable evidence becomes 
available.172 Such an approach to obviating the waiver doctrine captures the 
two impulses at the core of “neutral principles of law” methodology; it takes 
public law’s constitutional constraints into account, but leans on updating 
the application of private law rules in order to ensure that the religious 
commercial marketplace retains access to predictable and enforceable 
agreements.  
IV. PROTECTING RELIGIOUS COMMERCE 
Religious arbitration presents a vital safety-valve for religious commerce 
precisely because courts often overestimate the adjudicatory constraints 
imposed by the constitutional demands of public law. Responding to these 
uncertainties, parties can submit their disputes for binding resolution to 
third-party arbitrators who can address directly the religious questions 
underlying the legal conflict. And courts continue to support this framework 
by uniformly enforcing religious arbitration and agreements and awards.173 
 
170. First Health Grp. Corp. v. Ruddick, 911 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting Tri-
City Jewish Ctr. v. Blass Riddick Chilcote, 512 N.E.2d 363, 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)). 
171. See, e.g., Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(noting that “a party may not sit idle through an arbitration procedure and then collaterally attack that 
procedure on grounds not raised before the arbitrators when the result turns out to be adverse” (emphasis 
added)); Salsitz v. Kreiss, 761 N.E.2d 724, 733 (Ill. 2001) (“A timely objection preserves the right to 
challenge an award, even where the parties participate in the arbitration proceedings.”). 
172. Cf. Hous. Vill. Builders v. Falbaum, 105 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
appellee’s failure to investigate is not waiver of claim for evident partiality); Britz, Inc. v. Alfa-Laval 
Food & Dairy Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (no waiver of claim for evident 
partiality based upon facts only discovered after participating in arbitration); see also Middlesex Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that insurers did not waive their right 
to contest alleged impartiality of neutral arbitrator by participating in arbitration “because the insurers 
did not discover evidence of partiality prior to arbitration”); Ossman v. Ossman, 560 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding that claims of partiality were not waived because petitioner discovered 
relationship only after arbitration had begun). 













Unfortunately, critics of religious arbitration—instead of exploring how 
private law mechanisms can protect, support, and enhance the religious 
arbitration regime—have gone in the opposite direction. In so doing, they 
have advocated for expanding contemporary constitutional restrictions in 
order to limit or prohibit judicial enforcement of religious arbitration 
awards. Each such argument relies on a novel reinterpretation of the state 
action theory174—without such an argument, no claim that religious 
arbitration violates constitutional prohibitions could get out of the gate.175 
And although courts have uniformly rejected such state-action arguments,176 
plenty of scholars continue pressing arguments that the enforcement of 
arbitration awards constitutes state action.177 Critics of religious arbitration, 
however, have taken these arguments one step further, merging them with 
First Amendment claims that generate not just controversial, but dangerous 
outcomes threatening the very possibility of religious commerce. As a 
result, instead of alleviating the concerns facing parties to religious 
arbitration agreements, their proposals inject additional uncertainty into 
religious commercial markets generally and thereby undermine many of the 
very interests they seek to protect. 
A. Nondelegation and Legal Sophistication 
To start, consider Brian Hutler’s article, Religious Arbitration and the 
Establishment Clause.178 Hutler contends that “enforcement of religious 
arbitration agreements may be an impermissible delegation under the 
Establishment Clause nondelegation doctrine.”179 As Hutler notes, the 
Supreme Court articulated the nondelegation doctrine in the 1980s—that 
 
174. Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2111–15; Dasteel, supra note 121, at 60–61; 
Brian Hutler, Religious Arbitration and the Establishment Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 
350–65 (2018). 
175. See, e.g., Genas v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 75 F.3d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To prevail 
on [a] Free Exercise claim, [a party] must first show that a state action sufficiently burdened his exercise 
of religion.” (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963))). 
176. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 18 (3d 
ed. 2013) (noting that “[a]ll of the federal courts that have addressed the issue have held that commercial 
arbitration is not ‘state action’ to which constitutional protections apply”). 
177. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 48–49 
(discussing the public function test as applied to commercial arbitration); Richard C. Reuben, 
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 949, 993 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, 
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 42 (1997). 
I have elsewhere argued that even if one were inclined to embrace an argument that enforcement of 
arbitration awards constituted state action, there are reasons to reject such an argument in the context of 
religious arbitration. See Helfand, Counter-Narrative, supra note 93, at 3035–38. 
178. Hutler, supra note 174. 
179. Id. at 353. 












“important, discretionary governmental powers” cannot “be delegated to or 
shared with religious institutions”180—most notably in two seminal cases. 
The first, Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, invalidated on Establishment Clause 
grounds a Massachusetts statute that allowed schools and churches to veto 
applications for a liquor license within 500 feet of their premises.181 The 
second, Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,182 struck down a New York state statute 
creating a public school district geographically designed specifically for the 
Satmar Hasidic Jewish community in the village of Kiryas Joel. In both 
instances, the Supreme Court concluded that the respective legislation 
created a “‘fusion of governmental and religious functions’ by delegating 
‘important, discretionary governmental powers’ to religious bodies, thus 
impermissibly entangling government and religion.”183 At bottom, the Court 
concluded that a state “may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen 
according to a religious criterion.”184 
Hutler merges this constitutional principle with Shelley v. Kraemer, the 
Court’s decision prohibiting, on equal protection grounds, judicial 
enforcement of racially discriminatory restrictive covenants.185 Shelley is 
regarded as the high watermark for the state action doctrine; even though 
the racially restrictive covenant was an element of a private agreement, the 
Court held that judicial enforcement of those private agreements constituted 
state action.186 However, courts have generally refused to apply Shelley 
outside its context.187 Indeed, when addressing claims that arbitration 
constitutes state action, courts have responded by emphasizing the 
differences between the facts of Shelley and the enforcement of arbitration 
awards.188  
Hutler, however, sees utility in the analogy for a number of reasons,189 
including the following:  
 
180. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982). 
181. Id. at 126. 
182. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
183. Id. at 696–97 (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126–27). 
184. Id. at 698. 
185. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
186. Id. at 20. 
187. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping; a 
Time for Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 84 (1998). 
188. See, e.g., Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 233 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.). 
189. Hutler, supra note 174, at 357 (“Enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may impact 
the legal rights of individual litigants, especially if the parties’ respective religious beliefs or affiliations 
may affect the outcome of the arbitration. In addition, by analogy with redlining, consistent judicial 
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may result in the fracturing of the legal landscape, 














Judicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may also 
result in patterns of governmental favoritism toward certain religious 
groups, since some religious groups may be less sophisticated than 
others in drafting the agreements or in seeking their enforcement by 
courts, leaving them disadvantaged relative to other groups who have 
the requisite legal experience to execute the agreements.190 
In this way, Hutler argues, judicial enforcement of religious arbitration 
agreements qualifies as constitutionally impermissible state action under 
Kiryas Joel because it constitutes a “religion-specific delegation.”191  
It is worth noting that any argument building on the Kiryas Joel 
interpretation of nondelegation is likely to be inherently fraught. The 
decision itself argued that New York State’s delegation was constitutionally 
problematic, in part, because it had “no assurance that the next similarly 
situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one.”192 Of 
course, it was never clear why the Court could not have remedied this 
apparent concern if, in the future, a similarly situated group were denied the 
very benefit Kiryas Joel received.193 
But Hutler’s argument takes Kiryas Joel one step further. On his 
argument, even though the law currently provides an assurance that all 
forms of arbitration agreements will, in fact, be enforced—the very 
assurance that was purportedly missing in Kiryas Joel—the logic of Kiryas 
Joel still ought to apply. And the reason why the current arbitral regime still 
constitutes constitutionally prohibited favoritism is because the varying 
degrees of contractual sophistication developed within different faith 
communities creates asymmetries prohibited by the First Amendment.  
If judicial enforcement of religious agreements is constitutionally 
prohibited because of asymmetries in contract drafting, then Hutler’s 
argument would appear equally applicable to all forms of religious 
commerce. Markets for religious goods and services are, all told, predicated 
 
190. Id.  
191. Hutler separately explores precisely which forms of religious arbitration institutions, in his 
view, might qualify as religious institutions for the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 358–
61. 
192. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994). 
193. Id. at 727 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nor is it true that New York’s failure 
to accommodate another religious community facing similar burdens would be insulated from challenge 
in the courts. The burdened community could sue the State of New York, contending that New York’s 
discriminatory treatment of the two religious communities violated the Establishment Clause.”); Abner 
S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 60 (1996) (“The Court 
offered no response to Kennedy’s argument, because (I think it fair to say) there is no response. Although 
it might be difficult to show, in a future case, that the legislature should have granted a school district 
just as it did to the Satmars, this evidentiary problem is merely difficult—the Court writes as if it is 
insurmountable.”). 












on contractual arrangements that are enforced under the neutral principles 
framework embraced by the Supreme Court.194 But, if Hutler is correct, 
judicial enforcement of those agreements may violate the Establishment 
Clause, bringing those commercial markets to a screeching halt.  
Indeed, it is worth pausing over this conclusion. In adopting the neutral 
principles framework, the Court encouraged parties entering religious 
commercial agreements to leverage “the peculiar genius of private-law 
systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to 
reflect the intentions of the parties.”195 Accordingly, increasingly 
sophisticated drafting was precisely what the Court identified as the way 
forward for religious commerce. And yet it is exactly that “genius of private-
law systems” that Hutler holds against religious commerce; because 
different faith communities may adapt to the religious commercial 
marketplace at varying levels of sophistication, the legal rules affording all 
parties access to judicial enforcement ought to be construed as so 
asymmetrical as to trigger a constitutional prohibition. Indeed, by 
expanding the scope of public law’s constitutional prohibitions, Hutler’s 
argument threatens to undermine the very private law foundations that not 
only make religious arbitration possible, but make the entire religious 
commercial marketplace possible as well.  
B. Substantial Burdens and Freedom of Contract 
Critics of religious arbitration not only attack religious arbitration from 
the Establishment Clause side of the religion-clause divide; some have 
argued that religious arbitration undermines religious liberty and thereby 
violates free exercise prohibitions. 
The earliest version of this argument, advanced by Nicholas Walter, 
contends that enforcing religious arbitration agreements and awards violates 
the Free Exercise Clause.196 According to Walter, the problem presented by 
religious arbitration is that a party may be perfectly willing to enter a 
religious arbitration agreement; but by the time arbitration proceedings 
actually begin—which can take place many years later—that party may no 
longer have the same faith commitments. As a result, enforcing religious 
arbitration agreements and awards undermines an individual’s right to 
“change one’s beliefs.”197  
 
194. See supra Part I(a). 
195. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
196. See Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA 
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Walter’s argument suffers from two initial problems. First, Walter fails 
to advance a theory of state action so as to convert judicial enforcement of 
a private agreement into a viable constitutional claim. In addition, as Walter 
notes, under prevailing doctrine, laws that are neutral and generally 
applicable do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.198 In turn, it seems 
extremely unlikely to view the enforcement of religious arbitration 
agreements and awards in the same manner as their secular counterparts as 
violating the Free Exercise Clause.199  
These failings, however, have been addressed more recently by Jeff 
Dasteel, who has argued that enforcement of religious arbitration provisions 
in contracts of adhesion violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).200 Pursuant to RFRA, “Government shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from 
a rule of general applicability” unless that government imposition of a 
substantial burden can satisfy strict scrutiny.201 Dasteel’s primary target is 
contracts of adhesion.202 And, as noted above, his concern is that the 
religious question doctrine prevents courts from adequately assessing 
whether religious arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion are, in fact, 
truly voluntary.203 Accordingly, Dasteel argues that the “weaker party” 
should be able to assert a RFRA defense in order to avoid enforcement of 
religious arbitration provisions “included in contracts of adhesion when 
there is a disparity in bargaining power.”204 Under such circumstances, the 
reluctant party may be forced to participate in religious arbitration 
proceedings that make use of religious rules not in keeping with its religious 
commitments. Such circumstances—being forced to participate in such 
religious proceedings—could “substantially burden[]” a reluctant and 
“weaker” party’s religious exercise.205 
 
198. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
199. Walter, supra note 196, at 565 (describing this second rejoinder as “probably the strongest 
that can be made in defense of religious arbitration” and providing a response). 
200. Dasteel, supra note 121, at 58–65. 
201. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2018). To be sure, I have elsewhere argued that courts would 
do well to construe RFRA’s strict scrutiny as imposing a somewhat lower standard that strict scrutiny in 
other contexts. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of 
Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (2015).  
202. Dasteel, supra note 121, at 60–61. 
203. Id. at 62 (“The unconscionability defense under Section 2 of the FAA does not work for 
religious objections to religious arbitration agreements because the non-interference doctrine largely 
disables the objecting party from showing substantive unconscionability to religious arbitration. Thus, 
even where the indicia of consent are weak, under existing case law courts nonetheless have forced 
parties to engage in religious arbitration.”). 
204. Id. at 46. 
205. Id. at 46, 60. 












There are a number of reasons to be dubious of Dasteel’s creative 
extension of RFRA. The idea that judicial enforcement of a private 
agreement renders the impact of the agreement as attributable to the state is 
unlikely.206 And, as described above, private law can still avoid the 
consequences of the religious question doctrine and provide adequate 
opportunities for parties to raise standard contract law defenses to 
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements.207 
But Dasteel’s argument is problematic for another reason: the strange fit 
between the perceived problem and the proposed remedy. Dasteel is 
emphatic that RFRA ought not apply where the parties enter into the 
religious arbitration agreement voluntarily;208 it is only where parties 
involuntarily enter such agreements—where they have been “coerced” into 
participating—that RFRA ought to apply. But Dasteel fails to provide an 
explanation as to how a court might determine whether the parties entered 
into the agreement volitionally. Indeed, the entire problem he ostensibly 
identifies is that courts cannot police volition because the religious question 
doctrine prohibits courts from assessing substantive unconscionability. 
Adding a RFRA layer to that analysis fails to solve that problem. Dasteel’s 
proposal to limit RFRA defenses to involuntary agreements would 
encounter the same problem; a court would be unable to determine whether 
RFRA ought to apply because it still would be prohibited from assessing 
substantive unconscionability—and, in turn, the voluntariness of the 
agreement—on account of the religious question doctrine.  
Indeed, Dasteel further exacerbates this problem in an attempt to explain 
the potential applicability of RFRA to Garcia. On his account, the Garcias 
could have made use of RFRA as a defense to judicial enforcement of the 
religious arbitration provision in their contract with the Church of 
 
206. This is the analog to the state action doctrine discussed above. See supra notes 174–177 and 
accompanying text. RFRA incorporates the state action requirement into its text by only prohibiting 
government burdens on religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a); see also Elane Photography, L.L.C. 
v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 444–45 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (holding the New Mexico Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act to be “applicable only in cases that involve a government agency as an adverse party in 
the litigation” and therefore did not apply in a suit between private parties). 
207. See supra Part I(a). 
208. Dasteel, supra note 121, at 46 (“For parties who knowingly and voluntarily enter into 
religious arbitration agreements, the adjudication of both religious and secular disputes using religious 
principles and sectarian arbitrators is entirely consistent with the free exercise of religion, and the courts 
should continue to enforce the resulting religious arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act 
and analogue state arbitration acts.”); see also id. at 66 (“Application of the RFRA to religious arbitration 
agreements under the FAA also does not affect the right of parties to voluntarily submit their disputes 
to religious arbitration. Voluntary religious arbitration agreements should be enforced under Section 2 
of the FAA even though the grounds to review any arbitral award may be narrower than for secular 













Scientology.209 But this is far from obvious given that, when the Garcias 
executed the arbitration provision, they were committed Scientologists;210 
in turn, there appears to be good reason to assume that ex ante their initial 
agreement to arbitrate future disputes with the Church of Scientology was 
wholly volitional. 
In response, Dasteel makes a textual argument: “RFRA does not on its 
face require consideration of whether government action would have 
burdened religion at some time in the past. It appears to inquire only whether 
government action (here, compelling arbitration) would burden the exercise 
of religion now.”211 Accordingly, Dasteel claims that courts need not inquire 
whether the execution of an arbitration agreement substantially burdened a 
party’s religion, only whether the enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
burdens a party’s religion.  
This is a bait-and-switch. Dasteel argues religious arbitration agreements 
that were volitional at the time of execution ought to be fully enforceable 
because voluntary “adjudication of both religious and secular disputes using 
religious principles and sectarian arbitrators is entirely consistent with the 
free exercise of religion.”212 But when it comes to figuring out whether 
RFRA ought to invalidate an agreement, he declines to consider whether 
contextual evidence—such as a party’s religious affiliation and faith 
commitment—indicates that the execution of an agreement was voluntary. 
Instead, Dasteel dismisses those considerations as irrelevant to a RFRA 
inquiry because RFRA, he tells us, only cares about the nature of the 
substantial burden on religious exercise at the time of enforcement.  
It is hard to see how he can have it both ways. If Dasteel truly believes 
that religious arbitration agreements that were voluntary at the time of 
execution do not violate the free exercise of religion, then RFRA cannot 
only be applied by looking at whether a party would voluntarily submit to 
arbitration at the time of enforcement. In his words, if it “is entirely 
consistent with the free exercise of religion” to enforce religious arbitration 
agreements against “parties who knowingly and voluntarily enter into [those 
agreements],”213 then the application of RFRA cannot be based upon 
“whether government action (here, compelling arbitration) would burden 
 
209. Id. at 64 (“Had the RFRA been interposed as a defense, the outcomes of cases with facts 
similar to . . . Garcia v. Scientology might have come out differently, depending on the applicable state 
law of procedural unconscionability.”). 
210. See Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 178033, at *2–4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015).  
211. Dasteel, supra note 121, at 65 n.100. 
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the exercise of religion now.”214 Ultimately, the best explanation for why, 
on Dasteel’s account, voluntarily executed religious arbitration agreements 
do not violate the free exercise of religion, is twofold. First, there would be 
no substantial burden on religious exercise because it would flow from the 
free choice at the time of execution. And second, where the agreement was 
executed voluntarily, it certainly would not be a government imposing a 
substantial burden because it would be the result of the parties’ choice to 
execute the agreement. But this approach requires consistently looking at 
the volitional nature of religious arbitration agreements at the time of 
execution. 
Moreover, this inconsistency would place courts in an impossible 
position when applying RFRA. Not only would the religious question 
doctrine undermine the ability of courts to assess whether the parties entered 
a religious arbitration agreement voluntarily—and therefore whether RFRA 
ought to apply—but Dasteel’s reading of RFRA would further disable 
courts from leveraging contextual information—like religious affiliation 
and faith commitment—to inform an already challenging inquiry into the 
voluntary nature of the agreement. This double disability cements the failure 
of Dasteel’s theory. If courts cannot determine whether the parties 
voluntarily entered into the religious arbitration agreement—because they 
are instructed not to look at evidence from the time of execution—then there 
is no way to determine whether there is a viable RFRA challenge.  
Of course, maybe this simply means that, irrespective of the degree of 
consent at the time of execution, RFRA should prohibit courts from 
requiring a party to participate in religious arbitration proceedings where 
that party no longer believes in the relevant religious principles. Indeed, in 
such circumstances, that party might even find that the imposition of those 
religious principles constitutes a substantial burden on its present form of 
religious exercise. While clearly not quite what Dasteel has in mind, this 
would bring his argument in line with Walter’s argument by simply 
updating Walter’s proposed Free Exercise claim with a RFRA claim; 
accordingly, enforcement of religious arbitration agreements would present 
a threat to religious liberty because it prevents parties from fully changing 
the nature of their religious commitments.215 But that argument, at bottom, 
is not just about religious arbitration; it is a frontal attack on the very 
possibility of religious commerce because any religious commercial 
agreement might, in the future, prevent a party from changing its religious 
commitments. Agreements to, in the future, sell kosher products or employ 
 
214. Id. at 65 n.100 (emphasis added). 













a pastor could—in principle—serve to restrict someone’s religious choices 
in the future. A party who willingly entered such agreements—or any 
agreement that integrated both commercial and religious elements—might 
find the required performance religiously objectionable when it came time 
for enforcement. In turn, if enforcement of religious arbitration agreements 
can violate principles of religious liberty, then so can any agreement to enter 
religious commercial transactions. And a party seeking to assert such a 
defense would simply have to demonstrate a change in religious views 
subsequent to contract execution, wreaking havoc on the religious 
commercial marketplace.  
This is precisely why private law has imposed such strict limitations on 
contract doctrines that allow parties to avoid contract enforcement based 
upon changed circumstances.216 Maybe most notable among such doctrines 
is contract impracticability, which allows parties to discharge their duties 
based upon “the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made.”217 But the litany of 
doctrinal limitations on this defense have made its application extremely 
rare218—and with good reason; expansive application of contract defenses 
predicated on post-execution changes in circumstances would threaten the 
predictability of commercial transactions and undermine the ability of 
contracts to play their risk-allocation function.219 Attempts to aggressively 
extend the reach of public law—via religious liberty defenses—beyond 
what private law defenses allow would therefore do well to think twice; not 
only are the underlying concerns for such doctrinal innovations misguided, 
but they would serve to undermine the ability of parties to enter predictable 
and enforceable agreements that stand at the crossroads of religion and 
commerce.  
C. Reverse Entanglement and Identifying Religious Commerce 
Maybe the most thoughtful attempt to leverage constitutional constraints 
to regulate religious arbitration comes from Sophia Chua-Rubenfeld and 
Frank J. Costa, Jr.220 As described above, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa are 
concerned that courts cannot adequately regulate religious arbitration 
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through private law mechanisms.221 I have tried to explain why I believe 
these misgivings are at best overblown and at worst misguided.222  
But the argument pressed by Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa goes beyond 
criticism of the available private law doctrines. It also sees religious 
arbitration as violating core disestablishment concerns, specifically what 
they term the “reverse-entanglement principle.”223 Boiled down to its 
essentials, the principle is intended to ensure that courts “insulat[e] secular 
law from religious interference.”224 In this way, it is the “‘reverse’ in the 
sense that commentators and courts have traditionally worried about 
protecting religious tribunals from the state, and not the other way around. 
Here, the entanglement problem is that religious adjudication threatens the 
integrity of secular law.” 225 
In so doing, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa improve on prior constitutional 
criticism of religious arbitration. First, they argue for a narrower vision of 
state action, avoiding the attendant pitfalls of hitching their argument to 
Shelley v. Kraemer.226 Second, they expressly recognize the importance of 
limiting the reverse-entanglement principle so as to allow for the continued 
functioning of various forms of religious commerce.227 But notwithstanding 
these aspirations, the fundamental problem with the reverse-entanglement 
principle is that it fails to provide adequate guidance as to which disputes 
can be arbitrated and which disputes can be resolved in court. In turn, it is 
likely to leave parties without any certainty as to the enforceability of their 
agreements; indeed, it may in fact leave many religious commercial 
agreements without any forum for interpretation and enforcement.  
This consequence of the reverse-entanglement principle flows directly 
from its reinterpretation of the underlying Supreme Court doctrine. 
According to Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa, the reverse-entanglement 
principle derives from the distinction drawn in two of the Court’s church 
property cases, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich and 
Jones v. Wolf.228 In Serbian, the Court overturned a decision of the Illinois 
Supreme Court, concluding that the decision violated the First Amendment 
by injecting itself into a dispute over who was the true Diocesan Bishop.229 
By contrast, in Jones, the Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s use 
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of the neutral principles of law framework when determining ownership of 
the Vineville Church.230  
Reading these two cases together, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa conclude 
that “[t]he principle undergirding both Serbian and Jones directly implicates 
religious arbitration” because, on their reading of Jones, “the Establishment 
Clause bars religious interpretation of secular law as much as it bars secular 
interpretation of church doctrine.”231 In turn, the difference between the two 
cases is that “the disputed provision in Serbian was of a religious nature, 
whereas the disputed provision in Jones was purely secular.”232 It is for this 
reason that in Serbian, the Court concluded that adjudicating the claim 
violated the Establishment Clause; by applying secular rules to a religious 
dispute, the Illinois Supreme Court had impermissibly “entangl[ed] 
religious and secular legal traditions.”233  
By contrast, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa interpret the Court in Jones to 
have determined that the underlying case was secular in nature and therefore 
authorized the use of the neutral principles.234 Put succinctly, “secular 
disputes call for the application of secular legal principles” whereas 
“religious disputes call for the application of religious principles.”235 
Accordingly, the Court approved of the Georgia Supreme Court’s attempt 
to use neutral principles of law to resolve the underlying dispute.236 The 
fundamental problem, however, with this interpretation is that it 
misconstrues the distinction at the center of the Court’s church property 
cases. In justifying their reading of Jones as supporting the proposition that 
“secular disputes call for the application of secular legal principles,” Chua-
Rubenfeld and Costa cite the Jones Court’s statement that “‘in determining 
whether the [church] document indicates that the parties have intended to 
create a trust,’ a ‘civil court must take special care to scrutinize the 
document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts.’”237 
But read in context, this sentence is not about a broad entanglement 
prohibition against applying religious legal principles to secular disputes. 
It is a prohibition against civil adjudication of religious questions.238 This 
point is clear from the immediately preceding paragraph that identifies the 
benefits of the neutral principles of law framework in its ability “to free civil 
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courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, 
polity, and practice.”239 It is also clear from the sentences that immediately 
follow, which emphasize that the problem the Court seeks to avoid is “the 
interpretation of the instruments of ownership” by a “civil court to resolve 
a religious controversy.”240 And it is also clear from the subsequent 
paragraph where the Jones Court once again applauds the neutral principles 
of law framework because it allows “[s]tates, religious organizations, and 
individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not 
to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”241 In this way, 
the Court is not concerned about whether the underlying dispute is religious 
or secular. The Court is concerned with whether adjudicating the dispute 
requires resolving a religious question. 
This subtle category shift underlying the reverse-entanglement principle 
is not merely a mistaken interpretation of the case law. It introduces 
categories—religious dispute and secular dispute—that, by their nature, 
threaten to unsettle the possibility of predictable and enforceable religious 
commerce. To see why, we need to remember that in order to argue that 
religious arbitration can violate the Establishment Clause, Chua-Rubenfeld 
and Costa contend that religious adjudication of secular disputes constitutes 
prohibited entanglement.242 But the converse is also true on their account. 
The reverse-entanglement principle would not only prohibit religious 
adjudication of secular disputes, but secular adjudication of religious 
disputes. However, this category of religious disputes—one that never 
actually existed in Jones—lacks any meaningful definition.  
For their part, Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa flag the lack of definition: 
“This Comment does not offer a definition or theory of what makes some 
disputes ‘secular’ as opposed to ‘religious.’”243 They take solace, however, 
in the claim that,  
[a]s the Court seemed to do in Jones, we simply maintain that such a 
distinction can be drawn, and that such a distinction is meaningful in 
the Establishment Clause context. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 
603 (1979) (suggesting that “reversionary clauses and trust 
provisions” contained in church documents lend themselves to 
secular interpretation).244  
 
239. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. 
240. Id. at 604. 
241. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).  
242. Chua-Rubenfeld & Costa, supra note 123, at 2110. 














But this reference to Jones once again misses the mark. The parenthetically 
quoted phrase from Jones simply reinforces the fact that what the Court 
sought to prohibit is the civil adjudication of religious questions—paving 
the way for civil adjudication of clauses and provisions that do not require 
religious interpretation. The Court did not seek to prohibit the secular 
adjudication of religious disputes; indeed, it never conjured up the category 
of a “religious dispute” as a legally relevant category.  
But once saddled with these artificial categories of religious and secular 
disputes, the reverse-entanglement principle threatens the ability of courts 
to enforce any religious commerce; any enforcement of an agreement that 
has a religious component—whatever that might be—could potentially be 
prohibited under the reverse-entanglement principle. As Chua-Rubenfeld 
and Costa note, “some contractual disputes will be difficult to categorize as 
secular or religious. In those cases, the reverse-entanglement principle’s 
verdict turns on how one first characterizes a particular dispute.”245 The idea 
that the enforceability of religious commerce would turn on “how one first 
characterizes a dispute” would, no doubt, unsettle the religious commercial 
marketplace. No two parties could have confidence that any given religious 
commercial agreement would be enforceable because they would lack the 
requisite confidence, ex ante, as to how a particular agreement that mixed 
both religious and commercial aspirations would be classified by even the 
most well-meaning court.  
Chua-Rubenfeld and Costa certainly attempt to flesh out how a court 
might, in some circumstances, determine whether a particular dispute is 
either religious or secular. Thus, for example, they conclude that the 
reverse-entanglement principle is not implicated “when courts uphold 
decisions of religious tribunals applying religious law” and therefore “a 
court could compel specific performance of a contract to deliver kosher 
meat, as defined by a Jewish beth din, without running afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.”246 And they rightfully applaud this conclusion 
because any other “result would excuse breach against religious parties 
only, leaving them without the recourse of court protection.”247 But 
identifying the best judicial result does not quite explain why that judicial 
result is correct. It is hard to see why, for example, the enforcement of a 
contract for food certified by a particular private kosher certification agency 
would not qualify as the application of secular principles to a religious 
dispute—a category of cases that the reverse-entanglement principle deems 
beyond the adjudicative authority of civil courts. In this way, and once 
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again, the attempt to regulate religious arbitration through public law 
mechanisms not only misconstrues the inadequacy of private law 
protections, but in its attempt to compensate, introduces categories and 
mechanisms that further undermine the very system it seeks to protect.  
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional constraints of public law can, in principle, play an 
important function when it comes to religious commerce. At the extremes, 
they can prevent courts from wading so deeply into theological matters that 
adjudication veers into the territory of prohibited denominational 
preference. But in the main, regulating religious commerce can be done 
effectively and responsibly through thoughtful and, at times, creative 
application of private law. Mining private law, as opposed to public law, to 
regulate religious commerce is our best hope to both promote the 
predictability and enforceability of voluntary transactions while still 
providing doctrinal tools for those in need of the law’s protection. The 
current trend to view religious commerce through the prism of public law 
threatens the viability of this vibrant marketplace. Ultimately, critics who 
seek to expand the constitutional constraints on religious commercial 
instruments make two mistakes. They both underestimate the ability of 
private law to police the religious marketplace, and they overestimate the 
ability of public law to play this role effectively. Whether with respect to 
religious contracts, religious torts, or religious arbitration, courts and 
scholars would be better served exploring how private law can meet the 
needs of religious commerce. In the end, for religious commerce to survive, 
we would do well to remember what the Supreme Court recognized long 
ago—that the marketplace will thrive to the extent parties make use of the 
“peculiar genius of private-law systems.”248  
* * * * 
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